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ABSTRACT. International trade and the free movement of people are inevitably
followed by legal disputes. Such litigants require an efficient and predictable dispute
resolution mechanism capable of handling cases between diverse nationals. An
essential part of such mechanism is a clearly defined process of judgment
enforcement across national boundaries. In the past several decades, the European
Union (“EU”) has necessarily addressed judgment enforcement across the
boundaries of its member nations (“Member States”). Citizens of the EU need to
prosecute and defend their legal rights in their home and in other EU member states.
Presently, the EU is, again, considering such issues and is poised to make some
changes in this area. As with past EU legislation regarding judgment recognition and
enforcement, the proposed changes are intended to promote the growth of the
European economy by encouraging and furthering cross-border trade and the free
movement of people. This paper presents the following, (1) a brief introduction to
civil and commercial judgment recognition and enforcement in the EU, (2) the
current status of judgment enforcement as exemplified in significant case law, (3)
the deficiencies of current EU judgment enforcement Brussels Is, and finally, (3) the
proposed changes to such Brussels I currently.
Keywords: European Community, Brussels I 44/2001, judgment, recognition,
enforcement, exequatur proceedings

Introduction
International trade and the free movement of people are inevitably followed
by legal disputes. Such litigants require an efficient and predictable dispute
resolution mechanism capable of handling cases between diverse nationals.
An essential part of such mechanism is a clearly defined process of
9

judgment enforcement across national boundaries. In the past several
decades, the European Union (“EU”) has necessarily addressed judgment
enforcement across the boundaries of member nations (“Member States”).
Citizens of the EU need to prosecute and defend their legal rights in their
home and in other EU member states. Presently, the EU is, again,
considering such issues and is poised to make some changes in this area.
As with past EU legislation regarding judgment recognition and
enforcement, the proposed changes are intended to promote the growth of
the European economy by encouraging and furthering cross-border trade
and the free movement of people. This paper presents the following, (1) a
brief introduction to civil and commercial judgment recognition and
enforcement in the EU, (2) the current status of judgment enforcement as
exemplified in significant case law, (3) the deficiencies of current EU
judgment enforcement Brussels Is, and finally, (3) the proposed changes to
such Brussels I currently.
1. Cross-Border Civil Judgment Enforcement in the EU
The 1968 Brussels Convention (“Brussels”) was the first comprehensive
legislation dealing with, among other things, the enforcement of judgments
in the EU.1 As articulated in its preamble, Brussels’ ultimate goal was to
promote economic growth within the Union and harmonize the rules for
cross-border enforcement of civil judgments:
Desiring to implement the provisions of Article 220 of that
Treaty2 by virtue of which they undertook to secure the
simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal
recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts or tribunals;
Anxious to strengthen in the Community the legal protection of
persons therein established; Considering that it is necessary for
this purpose to determine the international jurisdiction of their
courts, to facilitate recognition and to introduce an expeditious
procedure for securing the enforcement of judgments, authentic
instruments and court settlements.3

Brussels applied to civil or commercial matters (excluding matters related to
family law, wills, bankruptcy, insolvency, social security or arbitration).4 It
addressed the mutual dependent subjects of jurisdictional and judgment
enforcement. On December 22, 2000, the European Council adopted
Regulation No. 44/2001 (“Brussels I”), which went into effect in March of
2002, effectively replacing Brussels and becoming the keystone of EU
procedural law.5 Most of the concepts included in Brussels I merely
reproduce the rules already in force its predecessor. As stated in its
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preamble, the principal aims of Brussels I, which applies to all member
states (except Denmark6), remain those of Brussels, “[c]ertain differences
between national rules governing jurisdiction and recognition of judgments
hamper the sound operation of the internal market. Provisions to unify the
rules of conflict of jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters and to
simplify the formalities with a view to rapid and simple recognition and
enforcement of judgments from Member States bound by this Brussels I are
essential.”7
Brussels I keeps the framework of the Brussels (but introduces a number
of amendments, which are outside the scope of this article). As with
Brussels, Brussels I applies to all civil and commercial matters only.8 The
substantive areas of Brussels I benign with Chapter II, which addresses
personal jurisdiction, and sets forth the basic rule, as found in Brussels) that
an individual is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state in which
the individual is domiciled, regardless of that individual’s nationality.9 The
real reach of the Brussels I over personal jurisdiction can especially be
appreciated in Section 2, Article 5 of the Brussels I entitled “Special
Jurisdiction.” Under this Article, the basic rule stays the same as Brussels,
but for all obligations in the sale of movable goods and in the provision of
services, the place of performance is the place were the goods have been
delivered or the services have been provided.10 As for subject matter
jurisdiction, Brussels I covers, generally, all contract matters, tort matters,
claims for restitution under limited circumstances, disputes arising out of
the operation of a branch, agency or other establishment, disputes in
connection with a settler, trustee or beneficiary of a trust and for claims
regarding payment of remuneration where cargo or freight has been secured
for payment.11
Recognition and enforcement of judgments are addressed in Chapter III
of Brussels I. Under Article 32 “[j]udgment means any judgment given by
a court or tribunal of a Member State, whatever the judgment may be called,
including a decree, order, decision or writ of execution, as well as the
determination of costs or expenses by an officer of the court.” Article 33
plainly and clearly reiterates the underlying principle of Brussels, “a
judgment given in a Member State shall be recognized in the other
Members States without any special procedure being required.”
Article 34 creates exceptions to Article 33 and its automatic
recognition, it states that judgments will not be recognized, “1.
If such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy in the
Member State in which recognition is sought; 2. Where is was
given in default of appearance, if the defendant was not served
with the document which instituted the proceedings or with an
equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to
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enable him to arrange for his defense, unless the defendant
failed to commence proceedings to challenge the judgment when
it was possible for him to do so; 3. If it is irreconcilable with a
judgment given in a dispute between the same parties in the
Member State in which recognition is sought; 4. If is
irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in another Member
State or in a third State involving the same cause of action and
between the same parties, providing that the earlier judgment
fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition in the Member
States addressed.12

The Brussels I recognizes the importance of respecting the jurisdiction of
the original court of judgment. With respect to any questions arising over
jurisdiction in the original court, the Brussels I defers all questions of fact to
that original issuing court.13 The respect afforded the original court on
questions of fact is reinforced in Article 36, which states: “Under no
circumstances may a foreign judgment be reviewed as to its substance.” If
an appeal is pending, the court in which enforcement is sought my stay the
proceedings pending the outcome of the appeal.14
Section 2 of Chapter III address judgment enforcement, the heart of the
issue. Article 38 allows for the enforceability of judgments cross-border.
The judgment is enforceable when an interested party makes application to
the proper authority in the other Member State for a declaration that the
judgment is enforceable in that other Member State.15 Although not
automatic, Article 41 states a judgment shall be declared enforceable
immediately on completion of the formalities in Article 53. Article 53 and
54 essentially states that if the party seeking enforcement produces with the
judgment a certificate that conforms to Annex V,16 then in that case the
judgment is presumed enforceable.
The judgment must be submitted to a specific court in the other Member
State. Annex II to Brussels I list the appropriate courts for each Member
State. Each Member State also retains the right to establish the procedure to
be used when making an application for enforcement. The party against
whom enforcement is sought is entitled to notice of the declaration of
enforceability and there is a right of appeal on the enforceability decision.
2. Two Illustrative Cases Arguing Non-Enforceability under Article 34
As detailed above, in absence of the applicability of the aforementioned
Article 34 defenses (and in some cases Article 35 defenses), pursuant to
Articles 32 and 33, recognition is expected to be virtually automatic.17 That
is, a judgment issued in a Member State is to be recognized in other
Member State without the need for any proceeding in the courts of the
12

latter.18 Enforcement, on the other hand, as stated above, is granted only
upon the satisfaction of the relatively simple19 exequatur proceedings
described above.20
The distinction between recognition and enforceability is, however,
blurred when it comes to remedies available to a party against whom
enforcement or recognition is sought.21 Firstly, both recognition and
enforceability can be refused on the grounds listed in Articles 34 and 35
only (articles which on the surface seem to deal with recognition only).22
Secondly, the exclusive remedy for a violation of either Article 34 or 35
provisions is an appeal of the declaration of enforceability, pursuant to
Article 43.23 In essence, no Article 34 and 35 defenses/grounds can be
raised by a defendant or the court, sua sponte, before (such as at recognition
stage) or during the enforcement/ exequatur proceedings. Once the
aforementioned Article 53 formalities are met, an enforcement declaration
must be issued without review by any authority. Review may only be had
subsequently, by appeal pursuant to Article 43(1).24 The net effect of this is
that the recognition and enforcement process becomes perfunctory; until a
defendant appeals the declaration of enforceability, courts cannot scrutinize
the judgment for which enforcement is sought to determine whether or not it
ought to be recognized.
In the end, all roads lead to the same place; both recognition and
enforcement are contestable only by the same exclusive means (an appeal
under Article 43) and only on the same grounds/defenses (Articles 34 and
35). Accordingly, further scrutiny of the procedural and substantive aspects
of Articles 34 and 35 is warranted.25 However, given the broad coverage of
these two Articles, this section of the article will limit its inquiry to two
cases, both representative of the workings of the appeal remedy. Both cases
deal exclusively with Article 34(2), that is, non-recognition in cases of a
default judgment for failure to appear.
As stated above, Article 34(2) states that a judgment shall not be
recognized “where it was given in default of appearance, if the defendant
was not served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with
an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable
him to arrange for his defense, unless the defendant failed to commence
proceedings to challenge the judgment when it was possible for him to do
so.”26 In general, Article 34(2) is intended to guarantee that the judgments
admitted to free movement in the Member States have been issued in
observance of the rights of the defendant. Empirical evidence shows that, in
practice, Article 34(2) is an often cited provision for objecting to the
recognition / enforcement of a judgment.27
The first of the two cases is ASML Netherlands BV v Semiconductor
Industry Services GmbH (SEMIS), (C-283/05) [2006] E.C.R. I-12041. In
ASML, the European Court of Justice handed down a ruling on the
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interpretation of Article 34(2). The procedural context of ASML is as
follows: ASML Netherlands BV (‘ASML’), a company established in the
Netherlands, obtained a default judgment (for failure to appear) in a Dutch
district court, against Semiconductor Industry Services GmbH (‘SEMIS’), a
company established in Austria. The judgment ordered SEMIS to pay
ASML the sum of 219,918.60 Euros. However, notice of the default
hearing was served to SEMIS only several days after the hearing, and the
eventual default judgment was not served to SEMIS at all.
ASML domesticated the judgment in Austria by applying for
recognition and enforcement in an Austrian district court.28 The Austrian
district court granted the enforceability application based on the
certification of the Dutch district court. At such time, a copy of the
enforcement order was caused to serve on SEMIS (the original default
judgment was, again, not included in such service). SEMIS appealed the
enforceability order to the regional court in Austria. The court found that
enforceability could not be allowed since the judgment should have been
served on the defendant to be “possible” for it to commence proceedings to
challenge the judgment, within the meaning of Article 34(2).
ASML appealed to the Austrian Supreme Court which referred the issue
to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), based on the Article 34(2)
exception. As previously set forth, the general rule under Article 34(2)
disallows recognition of a judgment when given in default of appearance if
the defendant was not served with the document which commenced the
proceeding in sufficient time and manner to allow defendant to defend
himself. Article 34(2), however, also creates an exception to this rule, which
allows recognition of a judgment even in absence of service described
above, if the defendant failed to commence proceedings defend himself by
challenging the judgment when it was “possible” for him to do so. ASML’s
argument was based on this exception when it argued that although SEMI
did not receive the notice of judgment, it had knowledge that the hearing
occurred and that a judgment was issued, in part because, although
untimely, SEMI had received notice of the hearing and proceeding.
Consequently, according to ASML, it was “possible” for SEMI to challenge
the judgment in the courts of the Member State where it was first issued.
The ECJ, however, decided “that Article 34(2) of Brussels I No 44/2001
is to be interpreted as meaning that it is ‘possible’ for a defendant to bring
proceedings to challenge a default judgment against him only if he was in
fact acquainted with its contents, because it was served on him in sufficient
time to enable him to arrange for his defense before the courts of the State
in which the judgment was given.” In other words, knowledge of judgment
alone is not sufficient, a judgment default most be properly served to the
defendant so that he may become acquainted with its actual contents and
remain in a position to defendant himself in a timely manner in the courts of
14

the Member State which issued judgment. In essence, service of the
judgment order is a second bite of the apple should the first bite (the service
of document which commences proceedings) fail. The ASML decision is
illustrative of Article 34(2) emphasis on the protection of the rights of the
defense, which derive from the right to a fair legal process, requiring to
begin with proper notice/ service of a complaint or a judgment order.
The second illustrative case, Apostolides v Orams (C-420/07) [2009]
E.C.R. I-3571 (ECJ (Grand Chamber)), is a landmark legal case for several
reasons beyond the scope of this article. The matter concerned the right for
Greek Cypriot refugees to reclaim land in northern Cyprus, displaced after
the 1974 Turkish invasion. The case determined that although Cyprus does
not exercise effective control in northern Cyprus, cases decided in its courts
are applicable through European Union law. The case, however, is also
significant to Article 34(2) interpretation. The Apostilides (Greek-Cyprus
nationals) sued the Orams (British nationals) in a Cyprus court, essentially
seeking a return of their land. The documents commencing such
proceedings were arguably defectively served upon the defendants, and
consequently, the Omars failed to appear in the case in a timely manner.
Unsurprisingly, the Apostilides prevailed and obtained a judgment based on
the Omars’ lack of appearance. The Omars eventually learned of the
judgment and applied to the same court to the have the judgment set aside.
At such proceedings, the Omars argued that they were not properly served
the documents which commenced the case. The court was not convinced by
their argument, accordingly, the Apostilides, again, prevailed and then
sought and received a judgment enforcement order in the courts of England,
pursuant to Article 43. The Orams appealed the enforcement order, pursuant
to Article 44 to the English Court of Appeal which then referred the matter
to the European Court of Justice.
The question posed to the CJ was as follows: “the referring court asks
essentially whether the recognition or enforcement of a default judgment
may be refused under Article 34(2) of Brussels I No 44/2001 by reason of
the fact that the defendant was not served with the document instituting the
proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a
way as to enable him to arrange for his defense, where he was able to
commence proceedings to challenge that judgment before the courts of the
Member State of origin.”29
In the light of the foregoing, the CJ stated, “the answer to the fourth
question is that the recognition or enforcement of a default judgment cannot
be refused under Article 34(2) of Brussels I No 44/2001 where the
defendant was able to commence proceedings to challenge the default
judgment and those proceedings enabled him to argue that he had not been
served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with the
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equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him
to arrange for his defense.”
In essence, in this case the CJ found that the defendants were adequately
protected even though Article 34(2)’s general rule requiring proper service
of initial documents was not satisfied. The CJ found that the defendants was
sufficiently protected under the aforementioned Article 34(2) exception;
despite the lack of service, the fact that the defendants, in fact, challenged
the default judgment demonstrated that it was “possible” for them to
commence proceedings to challenge the judgment, within the meaning of
Article 34(2).
In the end, while the respective procedural histories of the Apostolides
and ASML suggest a substantive inconsistency between the two cases, the
suggestion is only superficial. In both matters the protection of the
defendant is paramount to the CJ, and in both cases the CJ first and
foremost ascertains whether the defendant is procedurally protected. It may
additionally argued that despite its strive to protect a defendant’s due
process rights, the Apostolides case shows that the CJ will not choose form
over substance.
3. Brussels I and its Deficiencies
Presently, the Commission to the Parliament and Council of EU is
considering amending Brussels I. The Commission has acknowledged that
the Brussels I has worked well, however, after conducting empirical studies
t a number of deficiencies arose.30 The Commission has pointed out that the
goal of the revisions is “facilitating cross-border litigation and the free
circulation of judgments in the European Union. The revision should also
contribute to create the necessary legal environment for the European
economy to recover.”31 The Commission has identified four major areas of
concern.
Firstly, the current procedure for the enforcement of judgments in
another Member State (“exequatur”) remains an obstruction to the free
circulation of judgments. The process needs to be further streamlined so to
eliminate unnecessary costs and delays which currently deter companies
and citizens from making full use of the internal market.32
Secondly, access to justice in the EU is overall unsatisfactory in disputes
involving defendants from outside the EU. With some exceptions, the
current Brussels I applies only when the defendant is domiciled inside the
EU, and as a result, jurisdiction is governed by national law. The diversity
of national law leads to unequal access to justice for EU companies in
transactions with partners from third countries; some can easily litigate in
the EU, others cannot.33
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Thirdly, the efficiency of choice of forum agreements needs to be
improved. Currently, the Brussels I obliges the court designated by the
parties in a choice of court agreement to stay proceedings if another court
has been seized first. This rule enables litigants acting in bad faith to delay
the resolution of the dispute in the agreed forum by first seizing a noncompetent court. This possibility creates additional costs and delays and
undermines the legal certainty and predictability of dispute resolution which
choice of court agreements should bring about.34
Fourthly, the interface between arbitration and litigation needs to be
improved. Arbitration is excluded from the scope of the Brussels I.
However, by challenging an arbitration agreement before a court, a party
may effectively undermine the arbitration agreement and create a situation
of inefficient parallel court proceedings which may lead to irreconcilable
resolutions of the dispute. This leads to additional cost and delays,
undermines the predictability of dispute resolution and creates incentives
for abusive litigation tactics.”35
4. Brussels I and Current Proposals
Numerous studies of the current Brussels I paradigm have been conducted.36
Two studies examining different options for reform were conducted by
external groups,37 and several conferences regarding such revision were coorganized by the Commission in 2009.38 In the end, the Commission
encouraged and sought out the opinions of several outside groups before
moving forward with their final recommendations for revisions of Brussels
I.
Several principal recommendations for revisions were put forth, the first
of which is the proposed abolition of exequatur. As previously stated,
“exequatur is a concept specific to the private international law and refers to
the decision by a court authorizing the enforcement in that country of a
judgment, arbitral award, authentic instruments or court settlement given
abroad.”39 Under the current Brussels I, there are formalities that must be
met before a foreign court recognizes and enforces a judgment from another
jurisdiction. The proposed revisions would eliminate these formalities.
More specifically, the change would eliminate the need for a “declaration of
enforceability,” the documents discussed in the two cases in section II of
this article. “The Member States has reached a degree of maturity which
permits the move towards a simpler, less costly, and more automatic system
of circulation of judgments, removing the existing formalities among
Member States. The proposal therefore abolishes the exequatur procedure
for all judgments covered by the scope of Brussels I with the exception of
judgments in defamation and compensatory collective redress40 cases.”41
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The second proposal strengthens the validity of choice of forum clauses.
If private parties choose a particular court to hear a dispute resulting from
an agreement, the parties’ choice must be recognized regardless of whether
it is first or second seised.42 The proposal puts forth the rational that the
strengthening choice of forum clauses will “eliminate the incentives for
abusive litigation in non-competent courts.”43
Thirdly, the proposals seek to clearly recognize private parties’ choice
of arbitration clauses. The proposed revision “…obliges a court seised of a
dispute to stay proceedings if its jurisdiction is contested on the basis of an
arbitration agreement and an arbitral tribunal has been seised of the case or
court proceedings relating to the arbitration agreement have been
commenced in the Member State of the seat of the arbitration. This
modification will enhance the effectiveness of arbitration agreements in
Europe, prevent parallel court and arbitration proceedings, and eliminate the
incentive for abusive litigation tactics”.44
Fourthly, the revision seeks to better coordinate the procedural rule of
each Member States’ judiciary system, more specifically, procedural rules
in matters dealing with lis pendens rules b requirement that consolidation
has to be possible under national law. Concerning provisional, including
protective measures, the proposal provides for the free circulation of those
measures which have been granted by a court having jurisdiction on the
substance of the case, including – subject to certain conditions – of
measures which have been granted ex parte.45
The revisions also seek to increase access to justice, by for example, the
creation of a forum for claims of rights in rem at the place where moveable
assets are located and the possibility for employees to bring actions against
multiple defendants in the employment area under Article 6(1). This
possibility existed under the 1968 Brussels Brussels. Its reinsertion in the
Brussels I will benefit employees who wish to bring proceedings against
joint employers established in different Member States. Restoring the
possibility to consolidate proceedings against several defendants in this
context will mainly benefit employees. The revisions also propose making
mandatory information of a defendant entering an appearance about the
legal consequences of not contesting the court’s jurisdiction.46 This last set
of proposals appears to be technical in a sense and is aimed at the overall
improvement of cross-border enforcement and jurisdictional issues.

5. Conclusion
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Despite some deficiencies, Brussels I 44/2001 has been acknowledged as a
success. The Brussels I has provided businesses and individuals with the
predictability and reliability necessary for effective dispute resolution across
Member States’ borders. This clarity has, in turn, contributed to the
promotion of the economic growth desired beginning with the 1968
Brussels Brussels. A material aspect of this success has been the free
movement of judgments. Brussels I 44/2001 has achieved free movement of
judgments by greatly facilitating judgment recognition and judgment
enforceability.
Presently, under the Brussels I, recognition is obtained without the need
for any proceeding in the courts of the recognizing State, and enforcement
is granted upon the satisfaction of relatively simple exequatur proceedings.
Contemporaneously, as demonstrated by the ASML and Apostolides cases,
the intended ease is balanced by the CJ’s strict scrutiny of any procedural
defect which may undermine a defendant’s rights to due process.
Notwithstanding the Brussels I’s effectiveness, the EC is seeking to
further improve the paradigm by considering the enactment of certain
revisions. Several years since its enactment, empirical studies have
suggested that some modifications would further improve the Brussels I’s
temporal, monetary and procedural efficiency and result in greater
uniformity of these same factors among the several Member States.
The provisions’ principal goal remains the same as that of back in 1968;
the revisions are intended ameliorate the legal environment so to help
improve the European economy. To help achieve this goal, among other
things, the revisions would remove even the rudimentary exequatur
proceedings presently required by the Brussels I. The revisions are also
intended to create greater uniformity in access to justice by expanding the
authority to resolve disputes involving parties from outside the EU. Lastly,
the revisions would also help avoid evident, unnecessary costs and (at times
intentionally created) delays, by strengthening / establishing recognition of
choice of forum agreements and arbitration agreements.
In the end, as examined above, the proposed changes should add to the
fluidity of the free movement of judgments achieved by the present Brussels
I. And consequently, lead to greater commercial interaction between the
nationals of the Member States and the ensuing economic growth.
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pursuant to the Heidelberg Report (B. Hess/T. Pfeiffer/P. Schlosser, Report on the
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obtaining exequatur decisions varies greatly from State to State, the average time is
relatively short. According to the same source information, the judgment creditor
obtains a decision on enforceability within less than two weeks all necessary
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(1–3 months), England and Wales (1–3 weeks), Estonia (3–6 months), Finland (2–3
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Application of Brussels I Brussels I in the Member States (Study JLS/C4/2005/03
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20. Generally governed by Articles 38–52.
21. The decision regarding the declaration of enforceability may be appealed by
either party; Article 43 provides that “either party” may file an appeal, irrelevant of
whether the decision grants or rejects the application. However, typically, only the
party against whom enforcement is sought will have an interest in appealing a
declaration of enforceability.
22. Id., Chapter III, Section 1, Article 34.
23. Id., Article 43.
24. Id., and Article 53.
25. Id., Articles 34 & 35.
26. Id., Article 34(2).
27. Heidelberg Report… “In practice, the most important provision for objecting
to the recognition of a foreign judgment is still Article 34(2) JR. This provision
mainly applies to default judgments which occur frequently in the European Judicial
Area. Most of the problems relate to the service of the document instituting the
proceedings. In this context, the application of Articles 14 and 19 of the Service
Brussels I has proved to be difficult. 741 However, due to the amendment of Article
34(2) JR in 2001, its practical impact has been reduced considerably. Case law
shows that the former defense of a defendant that the document instituting the
proceedings was not properly and timely served is not longer successful.”
28. With regard to the aforementioned issue of remedies (available to a party
against whom enforcement or recognition is sought), it is worth noting that in
ASML the Advocate General (in points 26–28 of his ASML Opinion), observes as
follows:
[…] Brussels I 44/2001 provides that consideration of that
application will not give rise to a judgment by a court, but
simply to a declaration of enforceability, made either by a court
or by a competent authority following purely formal checks.
Contrary to what is provided in the Brussels Brussels, in
Brussels I 44/2001 it is only where an appeal is lodged against
that declaration that the grounds for refusal, such as the ground
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of infringement of the rights of the defense contained in Art.
34(2) of that Brussels I, are considered by a court. According to
Art. 41 of Brussels I 44/2001, the judgment is to be declared
enforceable immediately on completion of the formalities in Art.
53 without any review of the grounds for refusal contained in
Art. 34, in particular, of that Brussels I.
According to Arts 53 to 55 of Brussels I 44/2001, those
formalities comprise production of a copy of the judgment
making it possible to establish its authenticity, and of a
certificate issued by the court which delivered the judgment or
the competent authority of the state of origin, or, where
appropriate, an equivalent document. The certificate, which
must be drawn up using the standard form attached in Annex V
to that Brussels I, must mention in particular the date of service
of document instituting proceedings where the judgment was
delivered in default of appearance, and the fact that the judgment
is enforceable in the state of origin.
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